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Bioterror and “Bioart” — A Plague o’ Both Your Houses
George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
Since September 11, 2001, the threat of bioter-
rorism has caused Congress and the President to 
dramatically increase research funding for coun-
termeasures, including funding for new biosecu-
rity laboratories. The new kind of war against non-
state actors who use terror to intimidate populations 
has also made the creation of new ethical and legal 
rules for researchers seem critical. New laws have 
been passed, and there have been proposals for 
new codes of ethics for bioterrorism-related re-
search. Almost five years after September 11, how-
ever, the outcome of the development of new re-
search rules remains uncertain.
Ethical guidelines for life sciences research 
that could be related to bioterrorism are critical, 
and the scientific community should be actively 
engaged in setting the standards for such re-
search.1,2 As the National Research Council of the 
National Academy of Sciences has stated, “bio-
logical scientists have an affirmative moral duty 
to avoid contributing to the advancement of bio-
warfare or bioterrorism.”1 It is reasonable for so-
ciety to expect that scientists will adopt the equiv-
alent of the physician’s “do no harm” principle.1 
Arguing for such an oath well before September 
11, literary scholar Roger Shattuck noted that it 
could “help scientists scrutinize the proliferation 
of research in dubious areas” as well as “renew 
the confidence of ordinary citizens” in what is a 
potentially revolutionary endeavor.3
As the debate about the role of ethical stan-
dards proceeds, some legal standards have al-
ready been adopted. Even with their new legal 
powers, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have been 
unable to discover the source of the anthrax at-
tacks. The FBI investigations have, however, fo-
cused on two other biosafety cases that have be-
come infamous. Neither of these cases involves 
bioterrorism, but both illustrate how — in a post–
September 11 world — the federal government 
and the public can be expected to react and even 
overreact if new biosafety rules are broken in 
ways that may create a biohazard or public health 
problem.
The C ase of Thomas Butler
Dr. Thomas Butler was the first and so far the only 
physician-scientist to stand trial in the United 
States on a bioterrorism-related charge after Sep-
tember 11. On January 2, 2006, Butler completed 
a two-year sentence that was imposed after a jury 
trial and upheld by a U.S. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.4 The bioterrorism-related facts no longer 
seem to be in serious dispute.
According to his colleagues in the field of 
infectious disease, Butler has had a long and 
successful career dating from completion of medi-
cal school and residency at Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity at the end of the 1960s and his service in 
Vietnam in the Naval Medical Research Unit. He 
was a faculty member at Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Medical Center and Case Western Reserve 
University before becoming chief of infectious 
diseases at Texas Tech University Health Sciences 
Center in 1987, a post he held until his trial. His 
work on plague (Yersinia pestis) dates from his ex-
periences treating civilians in the Vietnam War. 
Most recently, this work involved research in Tan-
zania, where he and a colleague there compared 
the efficacy of gentamicin with that of doxycy-
cline in treating patients with plague infection.5 
The results of this research were published soon 
after Butler was released from prison.6
Butler traveled to Tanzania to help set up the 
study in 2001, and he returned in 2002 to collect 
samples of Y. pestis taken from the subjects. He 
returned to the United States with these samples 
without the required transport permits. In June, 
he drove to the laboratory of the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Fort Collins, 
Colorado, to have the samples tested, again with-
out the required government transport permits. 
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In September 2002, he sent a set of plague iso-
lates back to Tanzania in a Federal Express box 
labeled “laboratory materials” without the required 
export permits, and in October, he flew from Lub-
bock, Texas, to Washington, D.C. (to the Army 
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseas-
es), with plague samples without the required 
permit.
In November 2002, after a series of confron-
tations over timely documentation of complica-
tions and death among subjects in a study of an-
tibiotics for the biotechnology company Chiron, 
Butler’s local institutional review board prohib-
ited him from performing research on human 
subjects. On January 9, 2003, the board, dissat-
isfied by his lack of cooperation, reiterated the 
suspension in an e-mail.7 On January 10, he was 
notified by letter of a formal inquiry into his ac-
tivities. On January 11, a Saturday morning, But-
ler noticed that a set of 30 tubes of Y. pestis cul-
tures was missing, and he noted in his journal, 
“Set 5 missing!” The next day, he wrote, “Can’t 
explain other than intentional removal, suspect 
theft.”8 On Monday, January 13, 2003, he report-
ed to the biosafety officer at the health center 
that 30 vials of Y. pestis were missing from his 
laboratory. The next day, senior officials at the 
health center met and decided to notify the lo-
cal police and the health department. The police 
notified the FBI, and more than 60 FBI agents 
and local police officers conducted an immedi-
ate investigation.
Butler was questioned by the FBI, and he waived 
his right to counsel (this waiver is almost always 
a mistake). He first insisted that he did not know 
what happened to the samples. However, after 
failing a lie-detector test (the failure was not ad-
mitted in court) and, he says, being told by an FBI 
agent that if he signed a statement that he had 
accidentally destroyed the samples (to reassure 
the public that there was no danger), that would 
be the end of the matter, he signed a statement 
to this effect.4,9 However, this statement was not 
the end of the matter. Butler was arrested, spent 
six days in jail, and then was placed under house 
arrest. In April 2003, a grand jury returned a 
15-count indictment charging him with various 
crimes relating to his transport of Y. pestis, mak-
ing false statements to the FBI, and tax evasion. 
Texas Tech also turned against Butler and helped 
the prosecution reframe the university’s contract 
disputes with him as crimes. In August 2003, 
after Butler refused to plead guilty in exchange 
for a six-month sentence, he was charged with 54 
additional criminal counts; these included mail 
fraud, wire fraud, and embezzlement arising from 
Butler’s research for two companies (Chiron and 
Pharmacia–Upjohn — now Pfizer) and conceal-
ment of two contracts with the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) from the university.4
As part of Butler’s pay structure, a percentage 
of his income was provided by the state of Texas 
and the remainder came from the university’s 
Medical Practice Income Plan, which included 
money earned from seeing patients, research 
grants, and clinical trials. All monies from these 
sources, with the exception of consulting con-
tracts, were to be remitted to the Health Sciences 
Center. Butler entered into contracts with both 
Pharmacia and Chiron in which his fee per sub-
ject would be split between the Health Sciences 
Center and himself. These contracts, the first of 
which commenced in 1998, continued until Au-
gust 2001, and they did not come to the attention 
of the Health Sciences Center until July 2002.4
Butler voluntarily gave up his medical license 
before the trial. After the three-week trial, which 
included testimony from 40 witnesses, a jury found 
Butler not guilty on almost all the plague-related 
charges (which included lying to the FBI) and not 
guilty of tax evasion. It did, however, find him 
guilty on most of the charges related to his split-
fee contract arrangements (44 of the 54 fraud 
counts) and on 3 of the 18 charges relating to the 
transport of plague samples.4 He was sentenced 
to 24 months in prison and 3 years of supervised 
release and was charged $15,000 in fines and 
$38,675 restitution to the university. He appealed.
Five issues were raised on appeal. The two 
most important of these issues dealt with the pos-
sibly prejudicial effect of combining the “plague 
counts” with the contract counts and whether 
there was sufficient evidence of criminal intent 
relative to the failure to file the required ship-
ping forms for plague samples. Regarding the 
first issue, the appeals court ruled without much 
discussion (and arguably without much under-
standing of how medical research is conducted) 
that all these counts could be combined because 
they all had to do with Butler’s “research efforts”: 
“Butler’s handling of plague bacteria as part of 
his research efforts was ultimately related to his 
scheme to defraud HSC [Health Sciences Center] 
by concealing both his contracts with the FDA 
The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org at BOSTON UNIVERSITY on December 3, 2021. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 2006 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 
n engl j med 354;25 www.nejm.org june 22, 2006 2717
and the split contracts Butler maintained with the 
two pharmaceutical companies.” 4 If the Supreme 
Court agrees to hear his appeal, the possibly preju-
dicial effect of combining these counts is Butler’s 
strongest argument.
The appeals court also had little sympathy for 
Butler’s contention that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to show that he acted willfully in regard 
to the only 3 plague-related charges (of 18 charg-
es) he was convicted of: first, exporting plague 
to Tanzania without a license; second, describing 
plague as “laboratory materials” on a Federal Ex-
press waybill; and third, violating federal hazard-
ous materials regulations in shipping plague to 
Tanzania.4 Regarding the first and third plague-
related charges, the court was persuaded that be-
cause Butler “had successfully and legally shipped 
hazardous materials [during the 1990s] at least 
30 times before making this particular shipment” 
there was sufficient evidence that he knew how 
to ship it properly and that “his infraction could 
not have been due to a good faith mistake or a 
misunderstanding of the law.” As for Butler’s 
contention that he did not intend to deceive any-
one by labeling plague “laboratory materials,” the 
court accepted the government’s argument that 
he had also certified on the same label that he 
was “not shipping dangerous goods” and that 
the jury could reasonably conclude that he knew 
“that plague was a dangerous good requiring the 
proper identification.” 4
“Bioart ” and Bioterrorism
Shortly after Butler’s trial, in another part of the 
country — Buffalo, New York — FBI agents were 
called in to investigate a suspected act of bioter-
rorism in the home of Steve Kurtz, a professor 
and artist at the State University of New York at 
Buffalo. Kurtz awoke on May 11, 2004, to find 
his wife dead beside him. Kurtz and his wife pre-
viously had cofounded the Critical Art Ensemble, 
an artists’ collective “dedicated to exploring the 
intersections between art, technology, radical poli-
tics and critical theory.”10 Kurtz liked to distin-
guish what he did from the emerging field of 
“bioart,” which is perhaps best known to the pub-
lic because of the notoriety of Alba, a rabbit that 
glowed green because of the insertion of a jelly-
fish gene. Kurtz thinks of bioart as consisting of 
stunts and his own art as an exploration of “the 
political economy of biotechnology.”10 He had 
previously argued against the introduction of ge-
netically modified food, and he had encouraged 
activists to oppose it by means of “fuzzy biologi-
cal sabotage” — for instance, by releasing ge-
netically mutated and deformed flies at restau-
rants to stir up paranoia.10
The day after his wife’s death, the FBI raided 
his home in full biohazard gear. Kurtz had been 
studying the history of germ warfare for a new 
project. In connection with this project, he was 
growing bacterial cultures that he was planning 
to use to simulate attacks with anthrax and plague. 
He had obtained the bacteria samples (Serratia 
marcescens and Bacillus atrophaeus) from a colleague, 
Professor Robert Ferrell, a geneticist at the Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh Medical Center, who had 
ordered them for him from the American Type 
Culture Collection. Kurtz and Ferrell were sus-
pected almost immediately of being involved in 
a bioterror ring and were thoroughly investigat-
ed. Once the New York Department of Health 
determined that the bacteria were harmless and 
that Kurtz’s wife had died of natural causes, the 
bioterrorism investigation was dropped. The Jus-
tice Department nonetheless charged both Ferrell 
and Kurtz with four counts of wire fraud and mail 
fraud. The allegation was that Ferrell, at Kurtz’s 
request, defrauded the University of Pittsburgh and 
the American Type Culture Collection by repre-
senting that the bacteria samples he ordered 
would be used in his University of Pittsburgh 
laboratory.11 Neither case has yet gone to trial.
Exactly what Kurtz was planning to do with 
the bacteria is unclear, but serratia, which is 
known for its ability to form bright red colonies, 
has been used in biowarfare simulations in the 
past. Perhaps its most well-known use was a 
1950 simulation in which an offshore naval ves-
sel blanketed a 50-square-mile section of San 
Francisco with an aerosol spray containing serra-
tia to determine what dose could be delivered ef-
fectively to the population.12 Whether using a sim-
ilar technique as an art exhibit would constitute 
bioart, biotechnology, or biohazard (or even bio-
terrorism) may be in the eye of the beholder even 
more than in the eye of the artist or scientist.
Bioart is not bioterrorism, but the two are re-
lated politically. As bioart curator and commen-
tator Jens Hauser has said, bioart aims “at the 
heart of our fears” and is meant to “disturb.” He 
notes, “these artists expose the gulf between the 
apologetic official discourse about technosci-
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ence on the one hand, and paranoia on the oth-
er.”13 Like defensive and offensive bioweapons 
research, bioart and biotechnology may be im-
possible to distinguish by anything other than 
the researcher’s or creator’s intent. Thus, Alba, the 
bunny with the inserted jellyfish gene, is con-
sidered to be and is accepted as a creation of 
bioart, at least in the contemporary art commu-
nity; whereas ANDi, the monkey with the insert-
ed jellyfish gene, is considered to be a creation of 
science, at least in the biotechnology community. 
Hauser was referring to paranoia in the face of 
the “rapid acceleration of technical prowess.”13 
On the basis of the reaction of federal law en-
forcement to the actions of Thomas Butler and 
Steve Kurtz, however, although the advances of 
biotechnology that have potential applications to 
bioterrorism and biowarfare are scary, even scar-
ier are the responses — in the name of prevent-
ing bioterrorism — of law-enforcement agencies 
to legitimate scientists and artists whose actions 
pose no threat to the public.
Butler’s arrest came about one year after a 
simulated bioterrorism event in Lubbock, Texas; 
this simulation involved the use of aerosolized 
plague at a civic center.5 Simulations have been a 
centerpiece of efforts to prepare for acts of bio-
terrorism. As we should have learned from our 
obsession with building bomb shelters during the 
Cold War, however, simulations promote fear of 
worst-case scenarios and make them look much 
more likely. Bioterrorism simulations such as Dark 
Winter (smallpox) and Top Officials (TOPOFF) 
(plague) involve more art than science and are 
likely to provoke a response based more on fear 
than logic. They should probably be classified as 
bioart in the sense of performance art, and they 
should have their most socially useful outlet not 
in federal law-enforcement agencies or biosafety 
laboratories but in television dramas like 24.
Bioterrorism and Science
The case of physician-researcher Thomas Butler 
has been the subject of many commentaries — 
most arguing that his prosecution represents a 
gross overreaction on the part of federal author-
ities. Nonetheless, in an article in Science, Marga-
ret A. Somerville and Ronald M. Atlas argued that 
Butler’s prosecution “sent a clear signal to the re-
search community, especially scientists and uni-
versity researchers, that all ethical and legal re-
quirements must be respected when undertaking 
research.”14 They continued, “Biosafety regulations 
are not merely legal technicalities. They constitute 
some of the terms of the pact between science 
and the public that establishes public trust.”14
Somerville and Atlas are correct to argue that 
researchers must take law and ethics seriously, 
and their call for a new code of ethics is reason-
able. It would be too broad, however, to suggest 
either that there are no such things as “legal 
technicalities” or that all such technicalities are 
reasonable. Jennifer Gaudioso and Reynolds M. 
Salerno of the Sandia National Laboratories, for 
example, have argued persuasively that not all 
pathogens and toxins pose the same risks and 
that risk in the laboratory should “be a function 
of an agent’s weaponization potential and con-
sequences of its use” (rather than the current as-
sessment of biosafety risk, which focuses on “in-
fectious disease dangers and the risk of accidental 
exposure in the laboratory”).15 They also note that 
under the regulations of the Uniting and Strength-
ening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
(USA PATRIOT) Act and the Public Health Secu-
rity and Bioterrorism and Response Act that re-
quire entities with certain agents to register with 
the CDC, only 323 of the 817 facilities that the 
CDC expected to register actually did.15 Other fa-
cilities may register, but many research entities 
decided to discontinue their research projects, 
rather than conform to the new federal admin-
istrative and security rules for such research.15 
A 2006 National Academy of Sciences report re-
jects the use of an agent-specific threat list and 
instead recommends adoption of a “broader per-
spective on the ‘threat spectrum’ . . . to ensure 
regular and deliberate reassessments of advanc-
es in science and technology and identification 
of those advances with the greatest potential for 
changing the nature of the threat spectrum.” 2
Ethics and law are related, but they are not 
the same. Law draws the line we cannot cross 
without becoming “outlaws.” Even if we do not 
like it, we must nonetheless follow it (while work-
ing to change it) or risk, as Butler did, being 
prosecuted for being an outlaw. All Americans, 
including physicians, should recognize that when 
the FBI wants to talk to them about their role in a 
possible bioterrorist event, they should not talk 
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to the FBI without first speaking with a lawyer. 
Americans can go to jail for violating the law, 
but not for violating codes of ethics. We aspire to 
uphold ethics — we deserve praise (at least some) 
for behaving “ethically”; whereas we deserve none 
for simply following the law, some of which is in 
fact made up of “legal technicalities.”
Because the differences between research on 
offensive biologic weapons and research on de-
fensive biologic weapons are a matter of degree, 
not kind, and because biotechnology research is 
an international activity, any evidence that such 
research is doing more to put the public at risk 
than to protect the public will (and should) be 
especially damaging to the entire enterprise. This 
is one reason why Butler’s report of missing 
plague bacteria (still unaccounted for) could not 
be tolerated by federal officials who support the 
expansion of research on countermeasures. It is 
also what makes Kurtz’s bioart so disturbing — 
the public is confronted with the dark side of 
bioterrorism-related research, and it provokes a 
response. The inherent dual nature of biode-
fense research has been dubbed “the Persephone 
effect,” which refers to Demeter’s daughter who 
was forced to spend six months every year with 
Pluto in Hell so she could live the other half of 
the year on Earth.16
One reasonable response to the dispute be-
tween Butler and the Justice Department and 
the dispute between Kurtz and the Justice De-
partment could be Mercutio’s retort in Romeo and 
Juliet: “A plague o’ both your houses.” 17 This is 
because the public is currently more victim and 
bystander than participant and seems much more 
likely to be harmed than helped by much of the 
research. Members of the public recognize this 
probability, and their skepticism of federal au-
thorities, of the effectiveness of countermeasures, 
of the existence of weapons of mass destruction 
in Iraq, and of the entire bioterrorism scare is 
well illustrated by the few people who took drugs 
to treat anthrax that were offered after the an-
thrax attacks.18 This same skepticism, combined 
with the lack of evidence of stockpiles of small-
pox in Iraq and the certainty of side effects from 
the drugs, also explains the small number of 
health professionals who volunteered to take the 
smallpox vaccine immediately before and shortly 
after the commencement of the war in Iraq.18
Ethics ,  Bioterrorism, 
and Life Sciences Research
Research directed at creating new pathogens or 
toxins that have direct bioterror or biowarfare ap-
plications deserves condemnation. The National 
Research Council, for example, has identified 
seven classes of microbial experiments (Table 1) 
that should “require review and discussion by 
informed members of the scientific and medical 
community before they are undertaken.” 1 If such 
experiments are undertaken at all, I believe there 
also should be a requirement for publication of 
the protocol and public input into the decision. 
Research directed at individual pathogens and 
their weaponization potential also risks the di-
version of scientific resources from more impor-
tant public health concerns,19   just as it has seemed 
to divert the FBI’s attention from real terrorists.
There appears to be a consensus in the scien-
tific community that the free and open exchange 
of information is ultimately the best defense to 
both naturally occurring pandemics and deliber-
ate biologic attacks.2,20 There is also a growing 
recognition of the importance of developing an 
international code of ethics for scientists as well 
as a recognition that such a code must “become 
part of the lived culture” of scientists.2,20 Like 
bioart, the development of this code remains a 
work in progress.
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Table 1. Seven Classes of Microbial Experiments That Should Require Review.*
The experiments would:
Demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective
Confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents
Enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a nonpathogen virulent
Increase transmissibility of a pathogen 
Alter the host range of a pathogen
Enable the evasion of diagnostic and detection methods 
Enable the weaponization of a biologic agent or toxin
* Data are from the National Research Council.1
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